Green Industrial Policies in Emerging Market Economies: Can and Should They Follow Advanced Economies?

Clara Giendl, MSC International Economic Policy and International Relations

Executive Summary

This paper examines whether and how emerging market economies (EMEs) can and should follow advanced economies in implementing green industrial policies (GIP) to achieve sustainable development. As climate change accelerates and EMEs’ share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions rises, they face the dual challenge of fostering poverty-alleviating economic growth while mitigating environmental harm. While rich countries have historically driven emissions and now lead in green policy innovation, EMEs must chart their own course, balancing growth and environmental objectives.

I define GIP as government intervention to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon, resource-efficient economy. It offers opportunities for EMEs to ‘leapfrog’ outdated, polluting technologies, avoid costly future restructuring, and realise significant social, economic, and health co-benefits. Case studies highlight China’s comprehensive approach to reducing air and water pollution through a mix of regulation, market mechanisms, and green finance, how Norway’s natural resource management can(not) be applied to EMEs, and Morocco’s successful use of renewable energy policy to spur industrial development. They demonstrate that well-designed GIP can improve local environmental quality, create jobs, and foster innovation, even in financially constrained settings.

However, EMEs face unique challenges: limited fiscal space, weaker institutions, and the need to reduce poverty. They cannot simply replicate the large-scale investments or sophisticated regulatory frameworks of advanced economies. Instead, they should adapt lessons from global best practices, including targeted subsidies, blended finance, and phased transitions, while leveraging comparative advantages such as renewable energy potential or critical raw materials.

While EMEs deserve greater flexibility due to their lower historical emissions and acute development needs, enacting GIP is nonetheless in their interest. By prioritising policies that deliver immediate local benefits and spur innovation, they can align economic growth with environmental sustainability, positioning themselves for long-term resilience and prosperity. Advanced economies' successes can serve as inspiration, but must be carefully adapted to local contexts.

Introduction

Climate change is a global existential issue, threatening economies and livelihoods, while billions of people worldwide still cannot meet their material needs. Although advanced economies have historically been the main emitters of GHG emissions, EMEs are rapidly catching up in both absolute and per capita terms, with China now being the largest CO2 emitter in the world and 60% of global GHG emissions coming from low- and middle-income countries (Global Carbon Budget, 2024). Today, global warming may already have reached 1.5°C, and the time window to achieve the 2015 Paris Agreement target of remaining below 2°C is rapidly closing. For there to still be any chance of achieving this goal, all countries will have to contribute and decarbonise their economies (IPCC, 2022). However, EMEs also require significant economic growth to lift their populations out of poverty, and so far, growth has gone hand in hand with natural resource depletion and GHG emissions. While high-income countries bear the historical responsibility for climate change and should undertake the bulk of the mitigation, emerging economies must nonetheless achieve their growth in greener ways than before, or the outcomes will be catastrophic for everyone (Pegels, 2014).

The dual challenge of growing economically while mitigating and adapting to climate and environmental harms, also frequently discussed under the label ‘Green Growth’ (Adamowicz, 2022), is thus a crucial issue for EMEs today, and GIP is a tool for reconciling these aims. While there is controversy about whether truly green growth is even possible (Hickel & Kallis, 2020), it can and must certainly be greener than it has been so far. Climate change is often described as history’s biggest market failure (Stern, 2007), and a central aim of public economic intervention and industrial policy is to correct market failures by pricing in externalities. This can include negative externalities, such as climate and environmental impacts that the market mechanism does not properly account for, as well as positive externalities, such as innovation and technology spillovers into other sectors or the health and social co-benefits of many policies (Padilla, 2017).

Although the case for EMEs to pursue GIP is strong, they cannot exactly follow rich countries. Financial constraints make large-scale public investments challenging, and support and willingness to pay for mitigation policies are limited. Weaker institutions hinder effective implementation and enforcement, and many countries lack the skilled workforce required to compete in high-tech industries. Additionally, in line with the principles of a just transition, which are embedded in the 2015 Paris Agreement (Glynn et al., 2021), they should have more leeway to prioritise poverty reduction where trade-offs exist, while advanced economies must focus on mitigation efforts. Thus, the GIP of EMEs will look different from those of advanced countries, but they can and should nonetheless learn from their lessons and draw inspiration from good practice examples globally (Pegels, 2014; Tamasiga et al., 2025).

What is green industrial policy and why should(n’t) emerging markets do it?

Industrial policy can be broadly defined as government intervention to adapt a country’s economic structure in pursuit of a desired objective (Altenburg & Assmann, 2017). While there is no one agreed-upon definition of GIP, Hallegatte et al. (2013) describe it as any industrial policy with an environmental goal. Altenburg & Rodrik (2017) speak of government measures to accelerate the structural transition towards a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy while boosting economic efficiency, highlighting the blurriness of the distinction between GIP and climate or environmental policy. However, policymakers often view economic growth and climate protection as competing objectives. Especially in EMEs, many argue for lifting people out of poverty as fast and cheaply as possible now, including through extensive use of fossil fuels, and then ‘cleaning up’ environmental damages later. This aligns with the ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’ theory, which posits an inverse U-shaped relationship between economic development and environmental quality, meaning that it first deteriorates and then improves along the development pathway (Grossman & Kruger, 1995). This theory is, however, disputed and applies only to specific types of environmental impacts, while there is also a strong case for not delaying climate action in EMEs (Padilla, 2017).

The case for green industrial policies in emerging markets

Well-designed GIP gives EMEs a unique opportunity to develop sustainably from the start, as they are often not yet ‘locked in’ to unsustainable infrastructure and business practices. They can leverage recent technological developments to ‘leapfrog’ into advanced green technologies and increasingly efficient renewable energy systems, potentially allowing them to skip intermediate development stages and avoid costly restructuring later (Altenburg et al., 2017; Tamasiga et al., 2025). This can also create employment opportunities in high-skilled sectors, though to profit from this, countries must invest in human resources to build a skilled workforce (Esposito et al., 2017).

Social and economic co-benefits and positive spillover effects into other industries further strengthen the case for GIP in EMEs. Local environmental harms such as air and water pollution, desertification, and soil degradation cost millions of lives, impose large health and social expenditures, and hinder the accumulation of human and physical capital. For instance, almost all the most polluted cities and water bodies are in the developing world, creating significant potential for health and economic benefits from promoting cleaner industries and stringent environmental regulations (Harrison et al., 2017). Additionally, pollution and waste are signs of production inefficiencies, and resource-saving technologies can pay off economically even without considering their environmental benefits (Padilla, 2017).

EMEs in hot climates will suffer most from global warming, while they often also have high renewable energy potential and abundant raw materials needed for the energy transition. Small-scale renewable energy solutions like rooftop photovoltaic panels or local wind or hydrogen power systems can bring electricity to poor, rural populations more quickly, as they require smaller upfront investments and can even operate independently of the national energy grid (Altenburg & Rodrik, 2017). Building industries around critical raw materials for green technology, such as lithium and/or rare earths, can allow countries to continue to benefit from their natural resource endowments. GIP can promote vertical integration with higher-value-added sectors related to raw material extraction, such as processing and refinement of materials and subsequent manufacturing (Hristova-Politikova, 2024).

Challenges of green industrial policy in emerging markets

Despite the arguments for GIP in EMEs, they also come with unique challenges. Industrial policies are generally controversial, as they have often been ill-guided or poorly implemented and failed to achieve their development objectives, which is equally salient for GIP (Hallegatte et al, 2013). Effectively implementing and enforcing regulations in contexts with weak institutions, widespread corruption, and large informal sectors with many small firms is especially challenging (Harrison et al., 2017). EMEs also often rely on producing and exporting cheaply to compete globally, and environmental regulation might increase costs. However, it can also drive innovation and advance the transition to higher-value-added sectors where competition is not based solely on price. Whether and how this can be achieved depend on the country’s specific context and capabilities and requires carefully targeted policies (Ambec, 2017).

Many green transition policies require large up-front investments, which the limited fiscal capacity of low-income countries makes especially difficult, if not impossible, without outside support. Lastly, the situation is especially difficult for countries with large fossil fuel endowments, as they have an incentive to use these resources for their development and because non-renewable energies, especially coal, are still often the cheapest form of energy (Rodrik, & Stiglitz, 2024; Songwe et al., 2022).

Case studies and lessons learned from various green industrial policies     

Fighting air and water pollution in China through green innovation

Like other East Asian countries, China has been heavily using industrial policy to drive its development for several decades and is now increasingly shifting towards GIP. I focus on efforts to reduce air and water pollution from manufacturing without impeding firm competitiveness, thus tackling a major health, social, and environmental concern that many EMEs grapple with.

While there are arguably more famous examples of Chinese GIP, including its massive R&D investments in the photovoltaic energy and electric vehicle sectors, which have transformed these industries globally, brought down prices, and made China a market leader, they are not always reproducible by other EMEs. As the world’s second-largest economy, with a powerful government and a strong manufacturing base, including in high-value-added sectors, China can make large-scale, coordinated, and long-term investments that shape global markets (Altenburg et al., 2017; Wu & Salzman, 2014). Although R&D investments and promoting innovation are crucial for all EMEs, smaller and poorer ones with weaker institutional settings may be unable to replicate these successes, just like they cannot simply replicate rich countries’ GIP. However, local environmental regulation is something they can learn from and reproduce much more easily.

Chinese GIP to tackle air and water pollution combines regulatory, market-based, and innovation-focused instruments. The approach includes command-and-control tools (e.g., emission caps and shutdowns of inefficient plants), emission trading schemes for specific pollutants, and fiscal incentives and green finance initiatives such as low-interest loans or tax exemptions for clean technology adoption (Cao & Ramirez, 2020; Lan et al., 2023). The 2013 Air Pollution Action Plan and 2015 Water Pollution Prevention Law set stringent targets, while eco-industrial parks promote circular resource use and locate manufacturing away from the most densely populated areas (Fang et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2021). Renewable energy subsidies and penalties for non-compliance further enhance enforcement and help to internalise the cost of negative health and environmental externalities (Chen et al., 2021).

These policies reduced PM2.5 levels by 30-40% in key regions between 2013 and 2020 and increased wastewater treatment capacity by 65%, with green industrial zones like Suzhou cutting industrial water use by 25% through recycling. Market mechanisms such as Tangshan’s emission trading system lowered the steel sector’s SO₂ emissions by 18% over three years while maintaining output (Xu et al., 2021), and green finance programs spurred innovation, with patent filings for pollution-abatement technologies rising by 12% annually (Zhu & Tan, 2022). However, other studies found these environmental regulations to slow production and labour demand in affected industries, indicating that at least in the short run, there are still trade-offs to be managed (Liu et al., 2017). Additionally, excessive dependence on subsidies, high costs of technological upgrades for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and inconsistent enforcement across provinces driven by conflicting incentives between pursuing rapid economic growth and environmental objectives pose ongoing challenges (Chen et al., 2021; Zheng & Chen, 2020). 

Nonetheless, China successfully used GIP to greatly enhance air and water quality and related health outcomes while remaining a leader in global manufacturing. It shows that a well-designed mix of regulation, financial incentives, and technological support can facilitate a transition towards a cleaner industrial base. Other EMEs can learn from the comprehensive policy framework that combines market- and non-market-based tools to integrate environmental targets with broader industrial strategies, facilitates consistent enforcement, and promotes innovation and spillovers through green finance and R&D support (Fang et al., 2007; Lan et al., 2023).

Leveraging fossil fuels for Norway’s green transition: Lessons for emerging markets

The case of Norway exemplifies the lessons that EMEs—especially those with fossil fuel endowments—can learn from advanced economies, as well as how an exact reproduction is infeasible. Norway has successfully channelled its fossil fuel revenues to diversify its economy, following a broad-based industrial strategy that emphasises green sectors. Central to its approach is the Government Pension Fund Global, which was created to prudently manage and reinvest oil revenues. This sovereign wealth fund has provided a buffer against the volatility of oil markets and spurred investments across a range of industries, including emerging green sectors like renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure, and clean technology (Furubotn & Østby, 2008; Smith & Olsen, 2017). It has also allowed Norway to largely avoid the infamous natural resource curse or ‘Dutch Disease’, where a commodity boom leads to  a currency appreciation, which undermines the competitiveness of non-commodity exports and therefore often causes these industries to decline (Ramírez-Cendrero & Wirth, 2016). The forward-looking policy framework supported the development of hydropower and wind energy, reducing the nation’s carbon footprint and preparing it for a future without oil. The success of these GIPs reflects a combination of fiscal discipline, transparent governance, and strategic state-led investment in green technologies (Bakken & Haugen, 2015). While Norway is generally considered a good-practice example and has managed its natural resources more sustainably than some other countries, it must be noted that oil cannot realistically be a truly green industry, and Norway remains a significant GHG emitter (Rahman et al., 2026).

EMEs with fossil fuel endowments may draw inspiration from Norway’s experience, for example, by also establishing sovereign wealth funds to manage resource revenues and create stable, long-term financing channels for green innovation and diversification. This helps prepare for the energy transition through ‘sunset’ industrial policy, meaning transient support for unsustainable industries to smooth the transition towards a greener economy (Hallegatte et al., 2013). They can also design policies to incentivise investments in renewable energy and environmentally friendly industries, thus reducing the risk of a ‘resource curse’ scenario. However, unlike Norway, many EMEs struggle with institutional weaknesses, corruption, and political instability that can undermine the effective management of resource revenues (Ross, 2012). Moreover, different economic structures and social conditions mean that policy instruments may require substantial adaptations to fit local contexts. Thus, while Norway’s model provides a framework for transforming fossil fuel wealth into broad economic development and green innovation, EMEs must consider their unique constraints. Tailoring the strategy to local realities, including by strengthening governance institutions and ensuring fiscal transparency, remains a crucial prerequisite for successful policy replication (Cappelen & Mjøset, 2009).

The renewable energy transition as a driver of industrial development in Morocco

Morocco’s renewable energy push is an example of a small EME with a high dependence on imported fossil fuels recognising and developing its latent comparative advantage. By combining three policy frameworks—the National Energy Strategy, the Moroccan Innovation Initiative, and the National Industrial Development Plan—it used GIP to create employment, promote investments and innovation, strengthen its manufacturing base, and develop a greener and more secure energy grid. Institutional innovation, such as creating the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN), was central to these reforms, especially for large-scale projects like the Ouarzazate Complex, the largest solar farm in Africa, which created 1,600 permanent jobs and positioned Morocco as a strong regional player in the sector (Auktor, 2017).

As the only North African nation without oil reserves, one of the places with the most renewable energy potential, and among the most stable markets in the region, Morocco had strong incentives to set ambitious renewable energy goals. Interventions included developing a market for renewable energy technologies by facilitating public-private partnerships and enabling independent power producers to access the electricity network and export electricity. Domestic companies were supported and fiscally incentivised to enter the sector, and environmental rules and standards in other industries created a more integrated GIP approach. Moreover, extensive education, research, and training programmes related to the policies helped alleviate unemployment, especially among the (often highly educated) youth (Auktor, 2017; Vidican, 2015). 

Energy price surges following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have driven European ambitions to diversify away from Russian energy and accelerated the transition, giving Morocco the chance to expand on its initial efforts and become a renewable energy exporter (Zemlickienė et al., 2024). However, as with other natural resources, even an overreliance on renewable energy exports poses economic risks. An energy boom could lead to currency appreciation and other sectors losing competitiveness, which might harm development in the long run, but these risks are smaller than for other sectors. They can be mitigated by enhancing domestic innovation capabilities, which can create positive spillovers across industries and boost economic efficiency, and by promoting vertical integration across the renewable energy value chain (Leonard et al., 2024). 

While Morocco missed its target of 42% renewable installed power capacity by 2020, it was reached in 2023 with a renewable capacity of 11,000MW, and import dependence, though still high, has reduced substantially. The country now aims for 52% renewable energy by 2030, with 4,516MW in construction or planning by 2024 (Zemlickienė et al.). Moudene et al. (2023) conclude that increasing renewable energy consumption boosted sustainable growth and had multiplier effects across other sectors, enhancing the country’s manufacturing base. However, most of the remaining energy mix still comes from fossil fuels, many inputs for the renewable energy sector are imported, and the transmission infrastructure lacks the needed capacities. Further innovative financing solutions are required to achieve the desired speed and scale of the transition, as financing has relied heavily on international organisations, and progress is steady but slower than desired. Other problems include missing support and finance for small-scale projects and a lack of accountability for the monarchic government (ESCWA, 2018).

Many other EMEs in similar positions have latent comparative advantages in renewable energies, too, so a significant share of these policies could be reproduced. Although Morocco’s GIP is criticised for its reliance on debt and development financing, foreign finance increases the feasibility for fiscally constrained countries. Nonetheless, debt sustainability is a concern, and less stable markets might not have access to similar financing. While Morocco has realised several large-scale solar and wind energy projects, it is crucial to further emphasise small-scale projects by individuals and SMEs, which can be implemented more easily and drive industrial development through a bottom-up approach, especially in poor countries (Auktor, 2017; ESCWA, 2018).

Conclusion: What can(‘t) green industrial policy in emerging countries take from advanced economies?

EMEs can draw critical insights from advanced economies’ GIP but must adapt them to their unique socioeconomic, institutional, and ecological contexts. While economic growth remains essential for poverty reduction in low-income countries, it is not enough on its own. Integrating green objectives into industrial strategies offers pathways to sustainable development with localised economic, social, environmental, and health co-benefits. For example, with many emerging countries lacking the fiscal space for investments in large-scale projects, decentralised solutions can help them leverage their latent comparative advantages and industrialise more quickly, cheaply, and sustainably (Altenburg et al., 2017).

Policy flexibility to address poverty and infrastructure gaps is crucial for EMEs. While rich countries must prioritise emission cuts, EMEs might gradually phase out fossil fuels while expanding renewables (Pegels, 2014). Hallegatte et al. (2013) propose a mix of ‘sunrise’ policies that provide targeted support to promising but not yet competitive industries to phase them in, and ‘sunset’ policies to smooth the transition, make the phase-out of unsustainable sectors less painful, and protect vulnerable populations to foster political acceptance. Environmental policies should prioritise local pollutants that directly harm public health, as seen in China’s pollution controls, which reduced respiratory diseases and healthcare costs by 15% in industrial zones (Harrison et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2021).

Weak governance and limited fiscal space often hinder complex policies in EMEs. For example, emission trading systems and carbon taxes require robust monitoring and often raise prices for vulnerable population groups. Instead, simpler measures like renewable feed-in tariffs or green bonds offer more feasible entry points, which can be built on later. They should also leverage international financing (e.g., Green Climate Fund) and technology transfers from wealthy countries to offset transition costs (Bird et al., 2019; Songwe et al., 2022). Many EMEs still subsidise fossil fuels and other unsustainable sectors; cutting these subsidies would reduce perverse incentives while freeing up public money to be redirected to targeted green subsidies that enhance competitiveness (Cosbey et al., 2017). Harrison et al. (2017) also highlight the potential of innovative solutions, like satellite imaging for better monitoring, to enhance policy effectiveness in weak institutional contexts.

While EMEs’ GIP cannot currently replicate advanced economies’ decarbonisation timelines or ambitions, it must blend growth-oriented pragmatism with climate and environmental goals. Altenburg & Rodrik (2017) highlight embeddedness between the private and public sectors and other stakeholders, government discipline through clearly defined objectives and measurable performance indicators, and accountability of firms and policymakers as key principles of GIP in EMEs. By prioritising local benefits and leveraging international support and existing low-threshold technological advances, they can chart a distinct yet impactful path toward sustainability.

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